ISIS: The present situation in Iraq and Syria

The present situation in Iraq and Syria

From January to June 2024, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria. According to the most recent report from U.S. Central Command released on July 16, 2024, if this rate persists, IS is expected to double the number of attacks claimed in 2023.1 The report also indicates that this surge reflects IS’s ongoing efforts to "reconstitute" itself following years of reduced operational capabilities. What does this process of "reconstitution" entail?

The United Nations reports that the risk of an IS resurgence is becoming increasingly tangible, particularly in Syria, where the frequency of attacks is escalating. These attacks predominantly target Bashar al-Assad’s army personnel. The April report from the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Counter Extremism Project 2 raises concerns about the magnitude of these actions in March, especially in the Badiya desert, where the level of violence from IS’s insurgency has reached that of late 2017. This desert has emerged as a logistical and operational hub for several hundred fighters. Furthermore, attacks in Syria are more frequent and widespread in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). While IS appears incapable of seizing control of a major city, the resurgence of attacks in March 2024 underscores its ability to assert dominance in "vacant" regions.

In Iraq, the modest uptick in ISIS activity has been recently fueled by the partial withdrawal of American forces and escalating tensions resulting from the war in Gaza. Rural areas persist as a focal point for ISIS fighter cells, as evidenced by the attack on May 13, 2024, in the Salahadin and Diyala provinces.

The actions of the Iraqi and U.S. military pose a significant barrier to the establishment of a substantial territory fully controlled by IS. A key priority in countering the terrorist group is the elimination of its high-ranking officials to diminish its recruitment capabilities, jihadist training, and disrupt the planning of its attacks.3 4, Repeated operations by the Iraqi army in March 2024 resulted in the death of Samir Khader Sharif Shihan al-Nimrawi, who managed logistics along the porous Iraq-Syria border, including the transfer of fighters, explosives, and weapons. While there is a need for enhanced intelligence efforts to prevent attacks, the Iraqi army has markedly improved and appears more capable of combating ISIS. Furthermore, the marginalisation of Iraqi Sunnis has lessened. Nonetheless, should the 2,500 U.S. soldiers, as advocated by Prime Minister Mohamed Shia Al-Sudani, be withdrawn, the security ramifications would be severe, providing IS fighters with greater operational latitude. Additionally, the ongoing war in Gaza contributes to regional destabilisation and increases the appeal of radical Islamist organisations. Consequently, the threat from IS remains substantial in Iraq, particularly as it intensifies in neighbouring Syria.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury estimates that IS controls between $10 and $20 million in cash and other liquid assets in Iraq and Syria. 5 Despite this amount, the organisation continues to exploit local populations through extortion to maintain its operations.

The current status of fighters

There are approximately 2,500 active fighters aligned with IS in Iraq and Syria6, with around 1,000 based in Iraq. Over 9,000 jihadists are currently held in Syrian prisons, where regular operations are conducted to free these prisoners. Although efforts to repatriate the 2,000 foreign nationals to their countries of origin are underway, they remain insufficient. More than 42,000 individuals endure extremely harsh conditions in the vast al-Hol camp in Syria, which spans 3.3 square kilometres. Among them, 62% are women or girls [7-https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/camp-profile-al-hol-al-hasakeh-governorate-syria-april-2024] >, and more than one-third of those held at al-Hol are children aged 6 to 11 years. Despite a decrease in the number of detainees in Syrian detention centres since the peak in 2019, the long-term defeat of ISIS hinges on the repatriation, reintegration, and rehabilitation of these families into their home countries or communities. The recruitment of future generations of jihadists remains highly active in these open-air prisons. Last July, the Amnesty Law No. 10 enacted by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria is expected to facilitate the release of approximately 600 Syrian citizens imprisoned for terrorism and affiliations with IS 8.

IS’s global presence

IS’s presence is expanding in Africa, Central Asia (notably Afghanistan), South Asia, and Southeast Asia through affiliated groups. Among these, the most active are the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The Afghan branch is now clearly in a position of strength, demonstrating its capacity to carry out high-profile, destabilising attacks outside Afghanistan. This capability poses a significant threat and underscores its resolve. On March 22, 2024, over 140 people were killed in an attack claimed by this IS affiliate targeting a concert hall in Moscow. IS cells currently represent a serious concern in Russia and the Caucasus. ISKP serves as a regional hub, managing logistics related to finances 9 , weapons, and fighters. UN experts have raised alarms about the recruitment efforts and superior financial and logistical capabilities of the Afghan branch.

In early August 2024, Vladimir Voronkov, head of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, warned Security Council members about the growing influence of IS in West Africa and the Sahel. 10 He noted that jihadists have broadened and intensified their operations in these regions, stating "If these groups continue their expansion towards the coastal states of the North, a vast territory stretching from Mali to northern Nigeria could fall under their effective control." Additionally, the number of victims of IS-affiliated groups has risen significantly in northern Mozambique and eastern DR Congo, with reports indicating a strengthened presence in Somalia. In West and Central Africa, jihadist attacks have caused widespread population displacements.

What is the current state of ISIS’s resilience?

Experts are divided on the actual threat posed by IS. Some believe the group’s power and disruptive potential are not as significant as during the caliphate era, while others argue that addressing the growing threat is crucial, especially since current counter-terrorism efforts are inadequate. In Syria, the Russians, who are fighting jihadists alongside the Syrian army, prioritise their conflict with Ukraine. Meanwhile, the U.S. is focused on attacks by pro-Iranian militias. To effectively counter the evolving transnational threat from IS, a comprehensive and coordinated response is essential. IS’s Khorasan branch, increasingly capable of increasing regional tensions, now represents the main external terrorist threat to Europe. Effective counter-terrorism requires coordinated efforts across various actors and levels, including protecting human rights, preventing violent extremism, and ensuring access to basic services and infrastructure.

The CFRI does not take collective positions. Its publications only represent the views of their individual authors.