The Cypriot Gordian Knot

Adam Balcer*

The victory of Dervish Eroglu, often refereed to as "the hawk", in the presidential elections of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus puts the island’s reunification talks into question and could undermine Turkey’s chases of EU accession. The threat of a permanent deadlock could ultimately force a revision of EU policy towards Northern Cyprus and thus contribute to an acceleration of Turkey-EU negotiations. In order for this to take place, the European Parliament should use its new foreign policy powers, acquired under the Lisbon Treaty.

Turkey’s accession process and the problem of Cyprus’s reunification are closely linked. Maintaining status quo in Cyprus’s issue - the division of the island and the isolation of the Turkish part - is one of the key reasons behind the slow pace of Turkey’s negotiations. In the coming years, this situation could lead to a permanent deadlock in the negotiations (problems with the opening of new chapters). This scenario could have a negative impact on the internal situation in Turkey which is a regional power, EU’s most important neighbour after Russia and a key member of NATO. Taking into consideration the large and steadily growing influence of Turkey in the Middle East, the post-Soviet area and the Western Balkans, a crisis of the aforementioned negotiations would hamper the implementation of EU agenda in these regions. It will be much more difficult to put this agenda into practice in cooperation with Turkey, if Ankara is coolly indifferent or even reluctant towards the EU engagement. In this situation, the construction of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the diversification of energy (Turkey being a transit country) would also become difficult goals to achieve. The problem of Cyprus and its connection with the European aspirations of Turkey is also related to the EU’s credibility in the international arena as a serious political partner who fulfils its obligations. As a result, paradoxically, the worsening prospects for reunification of the island after Eroglu’s victory may contribute to the acceleration of the Turkish accession process, because the EU may want to avoid the possible collapse of the negotiations with Turkey. On the other hand, the acceleration of the accession negotiations may have a positive impact on talks on the unification of the island. So far, it has been said that Turkey’s path to the EU leads through the reunification of Cyprus. This year, it may be the other way around; the unification of the island will depend on of Turkey’s EU accession progress.

Vicious circle

Since the start of its membership negotiations in 2005, Turkey has opened only 12 negotiation chapters and closed just one. In comparison, Croatia, which began its negotiations at the same time, despite Slovenia’s blockade, managed to close 18 chapters and opened up 30. One of the important reasons for this slow pace of negotiations is the lack of Ankara’s recognition of Cyprus. The Cyprus problem has created a vicious circle mechanism in the EU-Turkish relations. In December 2006, in response to Turkey not extending the customs union to Cyprus, the EU froze eight chapters of the negotiations and excluded the possibility of closing chapters which would be open in the future. In December 2009, Cyprus announced that if Turkey was to fail in meeting its obligations, it would block the opening of the next six chapters. The freezing of eight chapters, an informal blockade of the following five chapters by France, and Turkey’s unpreparedness for opening of several other have caused the negotiation process to be put into question.

Until now, Turkey had not opened its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes, because of EU’s failure to fulfil its promise made in 2004, i.e. the abolition of trade embargo imposed on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC). Ankara is the only country which recognizes the KKTC and does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, a member of the EU. Lifting of the embargo was to take place through the implementation of the EU Regulation on Direct Trade with the KKTC. The European Commission assessed that the Council of the European Union, as in the case of other trade agreements, should decide on the regulation by a qualified majority. However, the Legal Service of the Council supported the position of Cyprus, which, relying on the Protocol on the Customs Agreement with Turkey, argued that in the case of Regulation the decision should be taken unanimously. As a result, the Regulation has not been put to the vote in the Council for six years. Until the last presidential elections in the KKTC, Turkey and the EU had expected that the problem could have been solved indirectly, through successful talks on the island’s reunification. The new state, established as a consequence of the union between the Republic of Cyprus and the KKTC, would be quickly recognized by Turkey. Nevertheless, the outcome of the presidential elections in KKTC largely undermined these expectations. Today, the greatest chance to prevent the crisis in Turkey’s accession negotiations is to use the new window of opportunity, opened by the Lisbon Treaty, of granting the European Parliament the right of co-decision in the EU trade policy. Under the Treaty, the Council has the right to vote on the Regulation on Direct Trade with the KKTC on the basis of qualified majority, if the European Parliament was to adopt a report recommending such a solution. The decision-making process was initiated recently by the European Commission which submitted a proposal for the preparation of this report to the Parliament.

The EU’s triumph and failure

The developments in Cyprus, which have been taking place over the last decade, are an example of European soft power’s capacities. Certainly, the most effective tool of this power is the enlargement process. On the other hand, the current stalemate in Cyprus also reveals EU’s greatest weakness – lack of unity. After becoming an EU candidate in 1999, the Turkish policy towards Cyprus was radically changed. This was a result of the EU’s conditionality of Ankara’s membership on the reunification of the island. In consequence, the Turkish government, the army and even the relative majority of the society endorsed the 2004 plan for reunification of the island prepared by Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary General. The plan was also supported by the U.S., the EU and the UN. On the other hand, prospect of Cyprus’s accession led to a "revolution" in the KKTC. In 2003, tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots (about 260 thousand people live in the KKTC) went out on the streets with EU flags. The demonstrations led to preliminary parliamentary elections and the victory of the supporters of reunification, which are still headed by Mehmet Ali Talat. In 2004, 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in a referendum for the Annan Plan. However, the Plan did not come into force, as over three quarters of Greek Cypriots voted against it. It was then - two days after the referendum and a few days before the accession of Cyprus - that the European Council adopted a declaration on the abolition of a trade embargo on the KKTC. Hope for the island’s reunification was brought back in the spring of 2008, when the presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus were won by Dimitrios Christofias, a supporter of Annan Plan and privately a good friend of Talat. (The President of Cyprus has a very similar position to his American counterpart). This change in public sentiments among the Cypriots stemmed from the fiasco of tough approach towards Turkey, which did not bring about further concessions from the latter. In consequence, in September 2008, negotiations on the reunification of the island between Talat and Christofias began. Many experts felt that such beneficial coincidence - two leaders connected by a bond of sympathy and support for the unification of the island - was never before experienced in Cyprus. Titles such as, "Now or never" began appearing in the press. By April 2010, despite holding over 70 meetings and agreeing on most of the important issues, the two politicians failed to conclude a final agreement. Talat’s room for manoeuvre was severely limited due a change of mood on the Turkish side. Turkish Cypriots have lost much faith in the EU and the unification of the island. The main reason behind this was a justified sense of unfair treatment from the EU, which did not lift a trade embargo. As a result, the KKTC parliamentary elections in May 2009 were won by the nationalist Party of National Unity, and, on April 18th, 2010, its leader Dervis Eroglu won the presidential elections. The winner announced the continuation of talks on the reunification of the island, but it is hard to believe in the sincerity of his intentions, taking into consideration his numerous declarations on the optimal solution being the legalization of the division of the island. Theoretically, Ankara may have put Eroglu under strong pressure. The KKTC is "subsidized" financially by Turkey. However, the leverage of the Turkish government is limited by the mood dominating in Turkey currently (strong support for the KKTC, a significant Eurosceptic minority). Eroglu can also count on the full support from the opposition in Ankara.

White+black=grey

The Cyprus issue finds itself under a huge shadow of painful history and its simplified interpretation. A basic condition for a lasting change in attitude of the EU countries to the KKTC is to go beyond a simple black and white image of the Cyprus problem (good Greeks, bad Turks), which still dominates in Europe. It is not disputable that the KKTC occupies about 37% of the territory of the sovereign Republic of Cyprus and was established as a result of the Turkish invasion in 1974, which led to deaths of hundreds and escape or expulsion of many thousands of Greek civilians. However, it is worth recalling that before 1974 the Turks were mainly victims of ethnic cleansings and massacres carried out by Greek nationalists, not vice versa. What is also important, during the invasion they committed crimes against Cypriot Turks as well. Before the Turkish intervention, the Greeks (78% of the inhabitants of the island) - in contrast to the Albanians (90% of the population of Kosovo), who have accepted Kosovo’s independence under the conditions of an equal status of the Serb minority (5% of population) and non-union with Albania - attempted to achieve the unification with Greece by using force or legal actions, breaking the agreement conferring an equal status to the Cypriot Turks (18% of the population). The Turkish invasion was not entirely without legal basis. The agreement in Zurich, according to which Cyprus was recognized by the international community, gave Turkey, Greece and Great Britain the right to intervene militarily in the event of breach of Cyprus’s status (a separate state of two equal nations). Indeed, in 1974 Greek chauvinists responsible for the deaths of dozens of Turks took power by a coup conducted under the slogan of Enosis (unification with Greece). Of course, it does not justify the crimes committed against the Greeks during the invasion by the Turkish army.

The EU should start to perceive the KKTC more through the axiological prism of present and future, rather than through history. The isolation of the KKTC has no legal basis in the international law. None of the UN Security Council resolutions on Cyprus has proposed an introduction of an embargo or sanctions against the KKTC. Also, the Protocol on the EU Customs Union with Turkey, which is so often recalled by the Republic of Cyprus, states that its implementation should not prevent the economic development of the northern part of the island. The surrealism of current situation is shown in the most striking way by the fact that today the only EU country trading on a large scale with the KKTC is ... the Republic of Cyprus. Most importantly, the isolation of the KKTC is a real absurd, taking into account the EU modernization agenda directed against the Muslim Mediterranean neighbours. The KKTC is, after all, a secular democracy based on rule of law, recognized - in contrast to Turkey - by the Freedom House since its establishment (1983) as a free political system. We should realize that apart from the KKTC, in Islamic world only Indonesia and Mali received such a note in the last "Freedom in the World 2010" report. An excellent opportunity to change an approach of EU countries to the KKTC provides a historical verdict of the European Court of Human Rights from March 2010, in which the Court rejected a claim of the Cypriot Greeks regarding the property occupied by the Turks in the northern part of the island. The Court assessed that a commission established by the KKTC government in 2006 to asses the Greek claims was an institution capable of conducting a fair trial.

All eyes on Germany

The EU’s position on the issue of Northern Cyprus will constitute a major test of European intentions towards Turkey in the coming months. Of course, Cyprus is not the only obstacle on the Turkish road to the EU membership. Cyprus would be far less efficient in blocking the Turkish accession if only there was a consensus among the rest of the Member States on this question. However, the governing elites in France and Germany (the Christian Democrats), the two most important countries in the EU, are against the Turkish membership, with Angela Merkel being slightly more flexible on the issue than the President Sarkozy. During her visit to Turkey in March, she confirmed that the continuation of negotiations remains a strategic objective of the German government, even though she did not consider the full membership to be their desired result. France needs Germany to block the Regulation on Direct Trade. This is why the German support is crucial to the adoption of this regulation. The Germans must be convinced that, given the current problems in opening new chapters and the impossibility of closing the old ones, further negotiations with Turkey will be very difficult, unless the embargo on Cypriot Turks is lifted. On the other hand, if the regulation is adopted, it will enable the "defrosting" of eight negotiation chapters and the closure of the ones which are already open. The effort of persuading the Germans should be made together by the European Commission, Lady Ashton and the countries supporting Turkish accession (that is the majority of Member States). The European Commission could present the regulation as a new tool which could be used to positively influence the process of negotiations on the island’s unification. They could also suggest a possibility of "freezing" the negotiations, in the case of an unconstructive approach of the KKTC in the unification talks, that the European Council could introduce into the Regulation. An eventual decision in this respect will be made by the EU Council through the qualified majority vote. Nevertheless, the Member States should not limit themselves to only using the stick. A declaration should be made that further regulations favourable for the KKTC (such as the facilitation of investments, easier access to visas, or financial support) could be passed, provided that the Cypriot Turks behave constructively in the negotiations. Most likely, the Republic of Cyprus will be against such measures. However, the EU countries can each have a sovereign policy towards Cyprus, just as they have in the case of Taiwan. It is worth recalling that the policy of Greece towards Macedonia changed in a positive way in the 90s after the EU countries resisted to the Greek blackmail. In the longer run, this change contributed to the political stabilisation in the Balkans. Similarly, Lady Ashton could involve Germany in tackling the Cyprus problem, for example by nominating the German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle (who supports Turkish accession) as the EU’s Special Envoy for the unification talks. Last but not least, the countries which support the Turkish membership should do it in a more assertive way, for instance by unanimously supporting the adoption of the aforementioned regulation.

Hope dies last?

The adoption of the regulation could break the vicious circle in the area of implementation of the Customs Union Protocol. The Turks have repeatedly declared that they will open their seaports and airports to Cyprus once the regulation is adopted by the EU Council. As a consequence, the EU would defreeze eight chapters and close some of the open ones. Furthermore, the acceleration of the accession talks and the adoption of the regulation would have a positive impact on the situation in Cyprus. The Turkish government would find it easier to gain social “silent” acceptance for a tighter course towards the KKTC. The development of trade relations between the KKTC and the EU would most probably lead to a substantial increase of European partners’ share in the trade balance of the former, thus giving Brussels larger leverage on the elite and the society of the KKTC.

After Eroglu’s victory, the EU and Turkey should further intensify their efforts in regards to the unification of the island. This will, however, be impossible without the implementation of the Regulation. Regardless of what one thinks about the Turkish accession, it is in the interest of all European countries to stabilize the situation in Cyprus, a Member State conflicted with one of the most important EU neighbours. The unification of the island is also in the interest of Turkey, given that the recognition of Cyprus is a sine qua non condition of its accession. The sooner this problem is solved the better, as from Ankara’s point of view it is better to enter the last, crucial phase of negotiations with a clear account. Eroglu’s victory does not necessarily mean that the chances for the island’s unification have been lost. What should be said is the “hawks”, usually perceived as the last defenders of national interests, have sometimes become signatories of the crucial peace agreements.

Eroglu’s victory can’t reverse the positive developments on Cyprus. Since 2003, six border crossings have been opened on the 180 km long border separating the KKTC and the de facto Republic of Cyprus (the last one in March 2010). The border can be crossed with a normal ID card. The movement of people between both parts of the island is relatively intensive. Many Turks are working on the Greek side of the island. During the last years, thousands have received a Cyprus ID card, which means that today the majority of the native Cypriot Turks have it. Moreover, cooperation between Greek and Turkish NGOs is booming. Another tabu has been broken this year, when the representatives of the Cyprus elite (including clergyman) visited Turkey and met Prime Minister Erdogan.

Nevertheless, we should remain realistic about the chances of the island’s unification. It is not incidental that the talks have been going on for several decades already. The island’s ethnic composition poses the most fundamental problem. The Turkish community, amounting to 18-20% of the habitants, is at the same time too large to be satisfied with a minority status and too small to be accepted as a second nation by the Cypriot Greeks.

* Adam Balcer is Senior Fellow & "EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood" Project Leader at demosEUROPA - Centre for European Strategy

For further information: demosEuropa