The essay highlights the pivotal reasons behind the mutation of the decidedly ethnic-driven and homegrown Chechen emancipation struggle into a Islamist-animated insurgency with region-wide ambitions and supra-regional reach, as borne out by recurring instances of terrorist strikes beyond North Caucasus. The successful Islamisation of the insurgency was rooted in a genuine appeal of the Islamist agenda to the Chechen population and elites alike, especially after the failure of the second war for Chechnya’s independence, as well as in Russian authorities’ decision to set the response to it in the framework of their own „war on terror”. The author concludes that while Islamisation might have reinvigorated or prolonged the insurgency, it has also diminished the chances for „serious external interest or involvement in the conflict”. Russia for its part will remain focused on holding on to its control over the region, approaching the insurgency from a security-oriented angle, but stopping short of addressing it’s underlying political, social and economic causes.

For further information: Polish Institute of International Affairs