Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Russia was negotiated and signed in the beginnings of democratic transition in the Russian Federation in the early ninenties. It is undisputable that its provisions do not address sufficiently today’s needs. Kremlin’s representatives present estimates according to which as much as sixty percent of the agreement should be scrapped. The expiry of PCA in November 2007 brings to the fore a question whether it should be replaced by a brand-new type of a document (with at least a few hypothetical scenarios on the table) or, alternatively, the PCA should be extended, notwithstanding all the visible shortcomings.

An analysis of the current state of debate leads to a conclusion that resources and efforts invested in reaching "a strategic partnership agreement" between the European Union and the Russian Federation might not be commensurate with the achieved results. The EU member states are divided in their assessment of the policies carried out by Moscow. New member states believe that the Union as a whole does not take sufficiently into account their interests and viewpoints while conducting a dialogue with Moscow, while the old members accusse newcomers of bringing their bilateral problems (and anti-Russian attitudes) to the Community level. It is coupled with the effect of the buzzword "strategic" in defining EU-Russian relations, which is supposed to reduce the value of problems raised by certain members in their political and economic contacts with the big Eastern neighbouring state. Russia, in turn, behaves in a rational way playing the member states of the Union off against each other and making use of an obvious advantage it enjoys in a dialogue with partner which needs to co-ordinate twenty seven national points of view as well as a few institutional ones. A clear example of such an approach is sending political messages targeted at the old member states concerning the exacerbation of EU-Russia relations in the aftermath of the May 2004 enlargement and the resulting break-down of the unity of European Union stance, which Russia allegedly deplores. An influential Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov in an article written for ’Ria Novosti’ on April 10, 2007, went as far as to say that the EU-Russia talks concerning a new agreement should be relieved of a time-pressure, among other reasons waiting for "the new Europeans to become normal Europeans".

An issue of fundamental significance in forging a strategic and confidence-based partnership should undoubtedly be placing it firmly on a foundation of common values. A mere interpretation of terms ’democracy’ and ’human rights’ introduces a visible gap between the EU countries and Russia. From the point of view of the new members, in particular Poland, the single most problematic issue in relations with Russia is a dispute over the post-Soviet space, its democratisation, modernisation and an increase of the level of interaction with the European Union which might eventually lead to obtaining a fully-fledged EU membership. In this context it needs to be emphasised, however, that in Moscow’s thinking the rivalry for influence in these areas has moved downwards on the scale of the most urgent priorities for the next decade. It is a consequence of a perceived conceptual and operational weakness of the European Neighbourhood Policy and a nearly non-existent chances of reaching internal EU consensus on its further enlargement to the East.

Even sketching out of this piece of a complex political facet of the EU-Russia relations indicates how difficult it will be to reach a comprehensive and practical results oriented strategic partnership. The situation on the economic front is noticeably different. Representatives of the European Commission have a positive assessment of the level of economic co-operation, despite certain highly mediatised setbacks in recent months (such as the failed engagement of the Royal Dutch Shell in the Sakhalin gas project). The level of foreign direct investments from the EU is rising, although they are still largely concentrated on the energy sector. A lot remains to be done in this area, in particular in terms of protection of property rights and general enhancement of the investment climate. The overall volume of commercial turnover increases in an impressive way, going from the level of 85 billion euro in 2003 to 166 billion euro two years later. The Union is by far the most siginificant trading partner of the Russian Federation, accounting for more than 50% share of total volume. Needless to say, the role of exports of the Russian natural resources, most notably the energy resources, has to emphasised. Key European companies from the energy sector from Germany, France and Italy have signed contracts with Gazprom securing the supplies of gas until 2035. In spite of certain turbulences in this field of co-operation over the last two years Russia remains the most reliable and predictable partner of the European Union, although it needs to be stressed that the level of confidence towards Moscow has been undermined. Interruptions in the supplies of gas and oil are one of the factors which have led, rather contrary to Moscow’s intentions, to the increased efforts aiming at putting more flesh on the bones of a common European energy policy, including energy efficiency and investing more in the renewable sources... Russian declarations of redirecting oil and gas supplies towards East Asia do not sound fully convincing, firstly due to the lack of infrastructure on the ground and secondly owing to the reliability and affluence of the European customers. All things considered, what we are dealing with is a classical example of a far-reaching interdependence.

Do the politically complex and economically developed relations with a partner like Russia constitute sufficient rationale for creating a comprehensive "strategic partnership"? It appears that the answer today would be negative. The differences go far beyond a communication gap between the partners, as they concern the perception of interests and forecasts on how the international scene will develop. Resolving of the key international security problems in which a co-operation between the European Union and Russia is necessary (Iran, Kosovo, Southern Caucasus) takes places regardless of the legal arrangements and status given to the EU-Russian relationship. On the other hand, one cannot treat Russia in the same way as Saudi Arabia, namely as a credible supplier of energy resources. It is hard to be overly optimistic about the state and prospects for the Russian democracy, but it should not be ruled out in certain time-perspective young generations of Russians will take a course more resembling European notions of how modern society and economy should look. Having said that, it seems that the best way to proceed would be to scale down the existing tensions by taking a decision to extend the PCA between the EU and Russia and supplement it with a short political declaration on the importance that both partners attribute to the development of their relationship. The attention and efforts should be consequently targeted at the implementation of more than 400 project agreed with the so-called four common spaces existing between the EU and Russia (in the fields of trade and economy, internal security, foreign and security policy and scientific, education and cultural co-operation) as well as, most importantly, to the support for the accession of Russia to the World Trade Organisation. There is a possibility that such approach will be more constructive and fruitful than elaborating a broad, strategic agreement, with a huge potential for disputes in the process of negotiations and an uncertain practical value.

DemosEuropa