Both sides have contributed to this sad state of affairs – Chancellor’s Schroeder dubious dealing with Gazprom on gas routes bypassing Poland, Berlin’s refusal to open borders to Polish workers to this day and public display of populist anti-German phobias by some Polish leaders have all but destroyed the buds of mutual respect and trust created by both sides in the years between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and Poland’s 2004 EU entry. Instead of becoming a mutual triumph, the final disposal of the Iron Curtain proved to be a point where Polish-German relations took a turn for the worse.

In Germany, there is bitterness due to the perception that the reward for championing and bankrolling Polish membership in the EU is a steady supply of invective coupled with obstinacy on key EU issues such as the Lisbon treaty, budget or clean energy.

In Poland, the venom of resurrected historical grievances has sipped through to the grass roots. The nationalist coalition government that ruled Poland in 2005-2007 managed to unsettle a number of Poles with unsubstantiated scares about alleged German efforts to reclaim lost eastern provinces or distort history by presenting Germans as victims rather than perpetrators of World War Two. Suspicion that Schroeder’s manly friendship with Mr Putin is emblematic of the continuity in German foreign policy (of the kind that left lasting scars in Poland) runs deeply in Polish society.

Mutual grievances on the official level have translated into worsening mutual perceptions among Germans and Poles. Surveys show most Germans believe Poland has become an obstacle to European integration and an EU “troublemaker”, giving negative stereotypes about Poles in general a new lease of life.

End of slippery slope but not much more

This slide down a slippery slope, which had negatively affected the ability of both countries to cooperate on the EU arena, was fortunately arrested in 2007 when a majority of Polish voters said a clear “no” to the isolationist, Germanophopic and eurosceptic policy.

Yet, the new Polish government (led by the sister party of Angela Merkel’s CDU) has not been able to free itself entirely from the foreign policy narrative imposed by its predecessors. The Polish media have also been rather uniformly nationalist, blowing real difficulties in bilateral relations out of proportion, ignoring positive instances of cooperation and jumping at every opportunity to show Germany and Poland divided on big issues such as Russia, energy security, missile defence or Georgia.

There is no denying that Warsaw and Berlin do not see eye-to-eye on many of those issues. It is also true that there are bilateral problems to resolve. But the differences often have to do more with tactic and strategy rather than long-term objectives. In fact, both countries share some absolutely fundamental beliefs and desires.

Take the future of the EU. Surveys show most Poles are in love with Europe and favour an ever closer union. Despite what you might read in the German media focusing on the antics of Vistula nationalists, most of the Polish political elite on the left, centre and moderate right also favour deeper EU integration, believing it is the best guarantee that Poland’s history of isolation and suffering at the hands of big neighbours will not come to pass again. This means they subscribe to and are stakeholders in Germany’s post-war European myth that sees the EU as a barrier against its own brand of virulent nationalism. At a time when finding ardent EU integrationists is like a quest for the Holy Grail, Warsaw is a natural point of pilgrimage for German Eurocrats. The trouble is they don’t drop by often enough and when they do, they are more often than not confronted with a litany of bilateral issues.

Russia and energy security come next. If you discard the familiar rhetoric from both sides about the need to be either tough or soft on Russia and actually look at the end games both countries seek to achieve, they will show to be quite similar. Warsaw and Berlin both want a predictable, “Europeanised” Russia that is a reliable partner in delivering energy supplies and resolving global security challenges such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Both sides also want a Russia which respects rather than intimidates its post-Soviet neighbours. Both finally believe that although it may be a dream that Russia become part of the European community of values, it is a dream worth having for the sake of future generations. The real differences on how to get there should be ironed out in a compromise between pragmatism bordering on appeasement and refusal to engage with what Poles are often too quick to call the “evil empire”.

Finally, relations with the United States. Compared to few years ago, the Polish and German viewpoints on how to shape the transatlantic relationship have become much more compatible. The new government in Warsaw has shifted its priority towards Europe, while Angela Merkel had discarded her predecessor’s anti-American tilt. Warsaw and Berlin both understand well that Europe needs continuous U.S. engagement particularly in security matters. The notion sometimes entertained in Warsaw that Poland needs as close relations with Washington as possible to counterbalance Germany is fundamentally flawed – Poland’s value as an ally raises for the U.S. when it wields influence and commands respect in Berlin. Poland at odds with Germany becomes a cumbersome partner for the U.S. besides playing straight into Moscow’s hands.

Onwards and upwards

So what steps could Poland and Germany take to work through mutual misconceptions and produce a fundamental partnership that would benefit both countries individually and give the EU a much needed new impulse?

Condition number one is that Poland must recognise that it can no longer be just a recipient of EU benefits but that it ought to become a contributor to the common EU future. The EU’s three principal actors (Germany, France and Britain) have made it clear they would be ready for Warsaw taking a more prominent role in the EU if it ceased to play almost exclusively to national interest and actually began to think more laterally about Europe. If Poland truly wants to matter in Europe, it must display continuous engagement with Europe. For starters, Polish politicians could drop their favourite phrase — “European solidarity”, which for EU partners has become synonymous with “give us what we want because we have been wronged by history and need to catch-up with you”. Solidarity is a founding principle of the EU but it is a two-way street.

More regular and more discreet consultation and coordination with Berlin on European affairs should follow. In the past few years, Poland has engaged in proxy diplomacy with Berlin via the media, often resulting in unnecessary acrimony over petty issues.

Germany should univocally back Poland’s desire to adopt the euro. Such moral support would not mean watering down of the entry criteria (something Warsaw is no longer asking for anyway) or making a commitment to any specific dates. But it would send a clear signal that the current economic crisis is not going to be used as a pretext to keep Poland and other EU newcomers out of the euro zone for longer on the dubious ground that their entry would destabilise the euro, already under pressure from some of the euro zone’s weaker members. It is remarkable that Poland seems to be singing a similar tune to Germany when it comes to sticking to the letter and spirit of the Stability Pact. In fact, its debt and deficit levels are of higher quality than that in some existing eurozoners. Berlin has a key role to play to give Polish euro zone aspirations credibility they deserve. Once in, Poland, with its constitutional limits on the size of public debt, would become a natural German ally in trying to enforce fiscal discipline underpinning the common currency. As part of the package, Germany should open up its labour market to the Poles next year as the status quo is a powerful symbol of treating them as second-class EU citizens.

Poland should consult Germany over the missile shield project. Poland irked Berlin and other EU partners when it initially refused to keep them informed about negotiations with the United States, even as Washington called the Polish-Czech installations a “defence of Europe”. From the Polish perspective, hosting the shield makes little sense unless it is a European endeavour.

Russia, stupid

If both sides were willing to do the fashionable thing and push the reset button, there is a major and urgent project they could get their teeth into — Russia. The EU is divided on how to deal with Moscow and a joint Polish-German initiative in this respect would go a long way towards changing this sad state of affairs. The timing could hardly be better – the EU is just launching Eastern Partnership, a Polish-Swedish project that offers closer ties to a group of post-Soviet nations but leaves Moscow out, reinforcing Russia’s suspicion that it is yet another Western plot to undermine its influence. This apprehension should be addressed via a complementary initiative addressed to Russia. For many, it may look like a mission impossible to get Warsaw and Germany on the same track in this particular area but the ground might have shifted in favour of turning such political fiction into reality. First, Poland’s attitude towards its former overlord has already become more pragmatic. Polish Prime Minister Tusk and Foreign Minister Sikorski made it clear they are not interested in Poland permanently wearing the “Russophobe-in-chief” tag. Some signs of more positive tone in bilateral relations have emerged and the planned visit of Prime Minister Putin to Poland in September might reinforce this trend. At the same time, German attitudes towards Moscow hardened following Russia’s Georgian incursion. For the first time in years, negative attitudes towards Russia are higher among the German population at large than in Poland, according to a German Marshall Fund study (http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/2008_English_Key.pdf). A favourable factor is that the global economic crisis has taken the wind out of Russia’s new assertiveness and temporarily reduced its ability to use energy as a political weapon. With oil at $46 per barrel and budget revenues in a freefall, the last thing Russia can afford is to disrupt deliveries and play games with European consumers.

Hence, for the first time in many years, it seems Russia is open for a more constructive dialogue with Europe and may be less determined to drive wedges between old and new EU members. Its proposals for a comprehensive security deal for Europe could be a point of reference for a counter-proposal from Europe. Poland and Germany could take a lead in putting it together.

Europe needs a dream

At stake is much more than getting the Russia policy right. Europe — divided, hit by the economic crisis and all but paralysed on the institutional reform front — badly needs a positive story, a doze of idealism that accompanied its founding fathers. There are a precious few of such potential positive stories and the coming out of Poland would be one of them. For several years the country has been totally inward-looking, engaging with the EU only when money was at stake. In foreign policy, it was hijacked for a couple of years by a tough-talking minority that almost succeeded in isolating their nation in the EU and globally. Things are on the mend but Poland would be wise to accelerate the drive to join the European mainstream. This path inevitably leads through Germany, but there is another compelling reason to re-engage with its big neighbour and for Germany to play along. They should do so to revive some of the spirit, hope and vision which accompanied the EU’s birth after the trauma of World War Two. Europe needs to dream its dream again and it might be that Warsaw and Berlin have the power to make it happen.

* Author is Director of Programmes and Member of the Board of demosEUROPA – Centre for European Strategy.

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